Nonetheless, not too many years after the second World War, more Lorenziantype tracts appeared, some of them highly sophisticated, by technically competent professionals-the anthropologist Coon [3] , for instance, arguing a theory of multiple and independent origins of the modern races of mankind-others, by writers of rather limited background in biology-Robert Ardrey [4] and his anecdotes on territoriality, for example. The flood continues, though now it is not rising undetected. Levees are being constructed. I distinguish a levee-builder from an intellectual opponent of social Darwinism in that the former, fearing the damage the flood can do, would prevent it with dams and sandbags, while the latter seeks the source of the waters so as to anticipate the flood and perhaps move to higher ground. Is the presence of a supernumerary Y chromosome in man associated with behavioral disorders? One could study this issue, seeking evidence that would test the null hypothesis; one could also refuse to allow the study or dissemination of the results on the grounds that prophecies of behavior are self-fulfilling and may thus be too dangerous to be admitted. It is not an easy choice.
This issue represents but one aspect of the dilemma of experimental sociobiology. When, to what extent, and how do studies of animal behavior-in particular, social behavior-contribute to an understanding of the social norms of man? The recent monumental study by E.O. Wilson [5] , through the impetus it has given biosociology, no less through the controversy it has spawned, makes this a particularly topical issue (see Wade [6] ).
One of the major difficulties in the interpretation of the behavior of other animals lies in the uniqueness of the sensory world of each species. Ironically, the man who is largely credited with the explicit recognition of this problem was one of Lorenz's intellectual mentors, von Uexkull [7] . von Uexkull introduced the term "Umwelt" to ethology, as a label for the environment as perceived by members of a particular species. A profusion of white blossoms which present a uniform Umwelt to us, would appear rather more heterogenous to bees, whose eyes distinguish between white pigments that reflect or absorb U.V. The song of two wrens, indistinguishable to us, may sound very different to a mockingbird whose capacity for temporal resolution of sound exceeds ours. And what is an empty, desolate room to us could be packed with the scents and reassurances of nearby companions to a rmore olfactorily acute mammal. In short, the stimuli to which responses are made are often not self-evident, and may be identifiable only with difficulty.
While the differences between species in their Umwelt may seem to present largely technical difficulties, they suggest a comparable lack of correspondence between some of the functional or emotional correlates of superficially similar patterns of behavior. Therein lies a second, major difficulty.
To understand the emergence of, let us say, the cusp pattern of human teeth, the comparative anatomist relies upon the existence of parallels between function and structure. Fossils often provide an additional clue suggesting how structures have varied in time. Some ethologists, steeped in the tradition of comparative anatomy, have applied anatomic methods to behavior. Territorial behavior in man is homologized with territoriality in other forms and its analagen may then seem to become visible. Hear Lorenz [8] at his Nobel ceremony:
As a pupil of the comparative anatomist and embryologist Ferdinand Hochstetter, I had the benefit of a very thorough instruction in the methodological procedure of distinguishing similarities caused by common descent from those due to parallel adaptation. In fact, the making of this distinction forms a great part of the comparative evolutionist's daily work. Perhaps I 78 KLOPFER SOCIAL DARWINISM LIVES! (SHOULD should mention here that this procedure has led me to the discovery which I personally consider to be my own most important contribution to science. Knowing animal behavior as I did, and being instructed in the methods of phylogenetic comparison as I was, I could not fail to discover that the very same methods of comparison, the same concepts of analogy and homology, are as applicable to characters of behavior as they are in those of morphology (p. 231).
There are many objections to this approach; mine have been often enough repeated, but the polemic can be allowed one more repetition:
1. The distinction between analogies and homologies is essential to the comparative approach, but the validity of this distinction is rarely, if ever, tested. The excretory organs of earthworms and men may appear similar only in function when viewed holistically; at the subcellular level their similarities may become structural as well. In short, the level of organization or "grain" of the investigator's perceptual field may determine whether two structures or behavior patterns are to be regarded as homologues or analogues [Klopfer, 9] .
2. In a few instances it is possible to trace a direct causal relation between the presence and action of a specific locus on the DNA and a palpable, measurable structure. In a minute fraction of these cases a further link to a pattern of behavior may be forged. This is rare. Since most behavior patterns can remain fixed even when the muscles subserving them vary, the further link to DNA is likely more tenuous yet. Behavioral development is a process involving multiple-feedbacks between DNA, cellular, organismic, and external environment rather than the lineal unfolding of a preprogrammed design for particular neuro-muscular networks. It is a system of multiple controls, often admirably buffered so as to maintain a seeming constancy of output, but with numerous intertwining pathways of causality and control. Thus, the concept of the "evolution" or "heritability" of behavior is only metaphorically comparable to the notion of the heritability of a particular cusp-pattern [Lewontin, 10] . Behavior, itself, does not evolve, but merely changes.
If there is indeed more than one way to skin a cat, what does this say about the legitimacy of efforts to generalize behavioral studies? Is generalization suspect? Recall Lehrman's cautionary tale concerning Federal childcare centers and motherless monkeys. Studies by Harlow revealed that surrogate-reared rhesus macaques displayed severe behavioral deficits. Ergo, child care centers which encourage surrogate-rearing are to be avoided. Later work by Kaufman and Rosenblum, with another macaque, showed this species accepting surrogate mothering happily. The two macaque species are more closely related inter se than is either to man [Lehrman, 11] .
Among the lemurs of the Duke Primate Facility are three species which have been the particular objects of my studies. Fig. 1 displays Lemur catta; it lives in the forests of Southern Madagascar, often alongside a second species, shown in Fig. 2 , Lemur fulvus. These animals are remarkably similar in their morphology and ecological relations. L. catta mothers, however, readily hand-off their infants to other females in their troop utilizing baby-sitters even when the infants are no more than seventy-two hours old. L. fulvus mothers, in contrast, are much more zealous in their guardianship; as a general rule, the infant is almost a month old before being regularly cared for by a sitter. And now consider the third species, Lemur variegatus (Fig. 3) Lest one believe that such major differences are merely reflecting a great taxonomic distance between the species, consider another subject of my work, the Toggenburg goat (Fig. 4) . Several years' work and experience with over 100 individual animals have revealed a very consistent pattern of maternal behavior. If the mother, immediately upon the birth of her infant, is allowed but a few minutes contact with it, a subsequent separation of 1-3 hours produces no permanent difficulties in reacceptance. Denied this contact, even a separation of half an hour may lead to permanent rejection [Klopfer, 13] . We know some other details about the underlying mechanisms, but our most recent efforts to bare-all, failed totally. These efforts were made at a commercial goat dairy, to which my colleagues, David Gubernick and Kathryn Jones, travelled in order to exploit the availability of a large number of animals. The control animals there did not conform to the usual pattern. This dairy herd consisted of half-breeds, still one species, of course, so we must now acknowledge that even intraspecific breed differences may be significant.
Where does this leave us? Is each species to be regarded as behaviorally unique, providing no basis for prediction of the nature of the next? This could be so, but as a matter of faith I prefer to assume there is a pattern which we have yet to perceive. The pattern is apparently not one that corresponds to taxonomic order. I suggest it may correspond to an economic order, and that it is to the province of cost-benefit accounting that we might turn.
The suppositions are simple enough. Whatever tactics pay may become fixed [note Hannon, 14] . "Pay-off," of course, must ultimately be interpreted in terms of genetic fitness. For many birds, laying a clutch of five rather than of three eggs ultimately fails to pay, because, on the average, the young from larger clutches are less better nourished and have a lower survivorship, with a smaller proportionate contribution to the next generation than young from smaller clutches [Lack, 15] . However, for species whose young feed themselves and whose food supplies impose no immediate limits, larger clutches pay better [Hutchinson, 16] . In short, outcomes are not always obvious, so while the supposition is simple, the determination of which tactic most increases fitness may not be.
The second supposition is that animals can respond phenotypically to new demands in advance of genotypic alterations. While there are obvious limits to this, men may learn to swim, but whales are unlikely to walk, we do have to assume that one particular mechanism-whether genotype, a limb, or a metabolic pathway-can come to subserve functions very different from those which selection originally favored.
The game is thus to determine what life-styles the demands and constraints of a particular habitat will favor, and to develop equations which include terms for such parameters as time-lags in responses to changed conditions, and morphological limitations to adaptation. The differences in mother-infant relations exemplified by my lemurs may then become explicable.
There are three general ways to play the game, several examples of which can be found in recent publications. Assume our goal to be an explanation for differences in degree of sociality. The first play entails listing broad principles, qualitatively stated but still operational and heuristic. Alexander [17] , for instance, has generated a list of the advantages and disadvantages of living in a group rather than solitarily. Group life affords greater protection from predators (except where protection is provided by concealment), and may enhance accessibility of highly localized resources. At the same time, competition for resources may increase, and the transmission of diseases or parasites facilitated. In an effort to apply Alexander's various "rules," Hoogland and Sherman [18] examined a colonial bank swallow and found the colonial habit did indeed increase competition for nest sites and materials, as well as mates, that it led to more instances of misdirected parental care and also more sharing of ectoparasites. Greater protection from predation was also provided, however, so this benefit, outweighed the other costs.
A second play is to focus more narrowly on those features which appear most pivotal with respect to the balance-of-payments. In the case of the swallows, this would be the benefit provided by protection from predation. Triesman [19] provides an illustration of this approach. He has examined the manner by which a predator detects potential prey. He then developed an abstract but testable variant of detection theory that predicts when the values of the governing parameters will prevent a prey organism from escaping. Pay-off for the prey then depends on promoting those specific conditions that preclude detection.
Finally, a third variant of the game, which will appeal to those more comfortable with equations than field glasses, is to construct wholly abstract models which identify the boundary conditions for certain forms of social grouping. J. Cohen's treatment of primate societies [20] illustrates this approach.
In short, a science of sociobiology may indeed be possible-the development of a theoretic framework within the compass of which we can predict and understand the varied manifestations of sociality. There remains the prospect that an encompassing theory, one which includes man, will suggest certain political actions, or argue against others. Equally plausible is the possibility that man will be shown so infinitely flexible as not to be biologically restricted to any particular social forms. Either way, we need to know the nature of our social heritage, if, indeed, we have one in any but an historical sense, and that harm from such revelations is no more inevitable than from any increase in knowledge. The partial knowledge that a species to species extrapolation provides is deceptive: we do well to shun that. Here I join the workers on the levee. But the bold efforts made by a few imaginative men [e.g., Wilson, 5; Emlen, S., 21] to explore the upper reaches of the waters, these we ought applaud. With such explorations we may yet find that the behavior of goats and lemurs can also reveal man.
